This polemic claim has generated intense controversy among political philosophers. The main criticisms have been made by political philosophers who have cosmopolitan inclinations. For instance, Nussbaum argued that there is no reason to relax the requirements of human rights and to tolerate certain injustices that are being performed just because a certain non-liberal group has successfully established an independent state rather than being located within the boundaries of a liberal state. 3) However, in this paper, I would like to propose an entirely different criticism: what I think is wrong with Rawls' theory of international justice is not that it tolerates too much, but rather, that it tolerates too little. That is, when The Law of Peoples is correctly interpreted, it will turn out that "the decent non-liberal societies" that the theory so emphatically proclaims to tolerate are not really non-liberal societies, but rather are more than sufficiently liberal societies. And if we strictly apply Rawls' criteria of "well-ordered societies" (which is comprised of liberal democratic societies and decent non-liberal societies), 4) not only do all non-liberal societies in our current international order fail to meet this standard and have to be reclassified as "outlaw states", but also a bulk of liberal (which includes libertarian) societies will fail to meet this standard and will have to be reclassified as "outlaw states" as well. And since, according to Rawls, outlaw states should not be tolerated and should be subject to political sanctions and even military intervention, the practical result will be that liberal societies must interfere with other society's politics far more often than it currently does.
Ⅱ. What Feature Distinguishes a Non-liberal
Society from a Liberal Society?
As I have briefly explained, in The Law of People, Rawls contends that the international society should accept even non-liberal societies as bona fide members. However, Rawls is not recognizing just any kind of non-
3) See, Nussbaum (2004) , "Women and theories of global justice" contained in The Ethics of Assistance, Cambridge University Press 4) The five types of domestic societies which Rawls distinguishes are: (1) reasonable liberal peoples, (2) decent peoples, (3) outlaw states, (4) societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, and (5) benevolent absolutisms. (Ibid., p. 4, 63) liberal society as a bona fide member of the Society of Peoples. There are certain conditions that a non-liberal society has to meet in order for it to be properly regarded as a genuine member of the international society.
So, what kind of non-liberal societies is Rawls considering when he claims that those societies should be regarded as legitimate members of the international society?
According to Rawls, the international society should acknowledge two types of well-ordered societies as genuine members: one is the liberal democratic society, and the other is the decent non-liberal society. Rawls often calls the decent non-liberal society as "decent hierarchical peoples"
(or just "decent peoples" for short) and identifies the basic political structure of this type of non-liberal society as a "decent consultation hierarchy".
Here, we must note the adjective 'hierarchical' that is being used in "decent hierarchical peoples"; it is contrasted with the adjective 'liberal democratic' which implies that hierarchy is the essential feature that distinguishes a non-liberal society from a liberal society. However, we
should not be carried away with what the term implies.
The term 'hierarchical' can be misleading in two ways. First of all, when anybody hears the expression "hierarchical" it is very easy for the person to imagine a rigid caste system similar to that of traditional India, where the life prospects of individuals are totally determined by the contingent fact of being born into a certain social class, and that it is this kind of society that Rawls is urging us to recognize as genuine members However, the requirement also rules out certain traditional forms of communal societies where individuals are required to inherit and follow the occupations of his or her family members. Whether this kind of social enforcement should be universally enforced is not entirely obvious.
The more important thing to notice is that Rawls is requiring nonliberal states to ensure freedom of religion and thought. What's so important about freedom of religion and thought is that they are the distinctive characteristics that make a society liberal.
I believe that what makes a society non-liberal is the fact there is some sort of control in the society that a typical liberal society lacks. The most usual form of control that takes place is that of thought and religion. This 'the burdens of reasons' 9) ), it is simply a social fact that pluralism will emerge within a society that is free from any significant control of thought.
And, it is also a social fact that this pluralism undermines the theological and ideological basis of the society. So, in order for a nonliberal society to remain non-liberal, it is essential for it to exercise some form of control that is incompatible with freedom of thought and religion. In this way, I doubt that state-religion can ever be possible in practice if a state really guarantees the freedom of thought and religion to all of its members. And this is why it is hard for us to regard a society that guarantees freedom of religion and thought as a genuinely nonliberal society; since by guaranteeing freedom of religion and thought, the society jeopardizes the very feature that makes the society non-liberal in the first place.
In fact, Rawls is quite aware that, by securing these rights and liberties Remember that one of the distinguishing features of a non-liberal society, as Rawls himself defines it, is that the society's conception of justice derives from a particular comprehensive religious or philosophical world view. However, it's not just aspects of social justice that derives
11) The five types of domestic societies which Rawls distinguishes are: (1) reasonable liberal peoples, (2) decent peoples, (3) outlaw states, (4) societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, and (5) Again, Rawls' footnote is suggestive. he says:
So I see the second part of the above criterion-that a decent people's system of law must be such as to impose bona fide moral duties and obligations-as following from a liberal conception of justice extended to the Law of Peoples. This might be true, but we must ask whether being unable to participate in overlapping consensus is necessarily a bad thing for a decent non-liberal society. To explain this, we must first remember why the notion of overlapping consensus was introduced in the first place; it was in order to settle the problem of stability in a reasonably pluralistic society. That is, Rawls noticed that, due to what he calls the burdens of reason, even people who are perfectly rational and reasonable can come to a disagreement in a free liberal society. And in this way, pluralism inevitably follows from a free liberal society. Now, the problem is this: if pluralism is inevitable in a free liberal society, then how can a workable And the answer is to initially present the conception of justice as a free -standing political conception, which doesn't rely on any particular comprehensive doctrines for its justification, and which can be justified solely by the type of reasons that are regarded as public. In this way, the conception of justice can be supported by all members of society regardless of what particular comprehensive doctrine each happens to affirm, and once the conception of justice is justified politically, it is up to the individual citizens themselves to find additional supporting reasons that derive from their own particular comprehensive doctrines. This whole process, as I have just mentioned, is what Rawls calls the "overlapping consensus". Now, if this is the case, then we are able to see that the set of conditions that make it necessary for a free liberal society to adopt the process of overlapping consensus in order to settle the problem of stability doesn't really obtain in a decent non-liberal society.
In a decent non-liberal society, there is a dominant comprehensive doctrine that the majority of its members affirm; in other words, a decent non-liberal society is essentially a monistic society. Therefore, there is no reason to present the conception of justice as a free-standing political conception which can be solely justified by public reason alone. In a decent non-liberal society, reasons that count as public are themselves reasons provided by the dominant comprehensive doctrine. So, the very need for a process such as overlapping consensus is totally absent in a decent non-liberal society.
In a decent non-liberal society, the conception of justice is, from the very start, presented and justified by the dominant comprehensive doctrine of the society. And this alone suffices the conception of justice in question to be stable over time. In fact, in such monistic societies, conceptions of justice that are derived directly from the society's dominant comprehensive doctrine might be far more stable than a conception of justice that is derived from a free-standing political conception, since in the former case, the conception of justice will have direct emotional appeal rather than relying on the person's disinterested intellectual reasoning powers which will likely be the case of the latter.
(e.g. In a religiously predominant society, a conception of justice that is deemed to be the orders of God might be able to receive more willing support than a conception of justice that is alleged to show equal respect for everybody as moral persons.) So, it is true that members living in a decent non-liberal society will not be able to participate in overlapping consensus. However, in a decent non-liberal society there will be no need for the society to adopt such process in the first place. Therefore, the sole fact that the decent nonliberal society lacks the process of overlapping consensus doesn't really show that the decent non-liberal society is different in any significant sense with the free liberal society when the two types of societies impose exactly the same legal duties and obligations to its members.
The Third Part of the Second Criterion: The Internalist Requirement
The third thing which Rawls requires for non-liberal societies is that:
There must be a sincere and not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice. This is a real problem since it is perfectly possible for a government official, living in a non-liberal society where slavery is officially institutionalized, to sincerely believe that the institution of slavery is really part of the common good idea of justice of that society. Furthermore, viewed from the perspective of the dominant comprehensive doctrine of that particular society, this belief may not even be unreasonable.
Conversely, there might be a government official who implements a certain social policy which meets all the right standards of a just liberal welfare program, but doesn't really believe that the social policy in question accords with the common good idea of justice of that society. If this is the case, which society should we regard as more decent?
It seems that Rawls was aware of this problem. So, he proposes a certain form of behaviorist solution. That is, Rawls presents a way to decide whether or not a non-liberal society is meeting the internalist requirement by looking at the actual practices of the government policies that are being implemented in the non-liberal society in question.
It would be unreasonable, if not irrational, for judges and other officials to think that the common good idea of justice, which assigns human rights to all members of a people, is being followed when those rights are systematically violated. We can interpret this requirement as some sort of safe-guard against the violation of human rights that might, in practice, occur in a nonliberal society. That is, the first part of the second criterion requires nonliberal states to include human rights in their system of law. However, human rights can still be violated in actual practice even though they are enshrined in the non-liberal society's constitution. The third part of the second criterion guarantees that these human rights are not merely institutional lip-services but are actually guaranteed in real social life.
Decent Consultation Hierarchy
There is one last thing that Rawls requires for the non-liberal society to meet which is extremely important. The last thing that Rawls requires for a non-liberal society is for its legal system to contain what Rawls calls a 'decent consultation hierarchy'. So, what is a decent consultation hierarchy? According to Rawls, In political decisions a decent consultation hierarchy allows an opportunity for different voices to be heard (…) Persons as members of associations, corporations, and estates have the right at some point in the procedure of consultation (…) to express political dissent, and the government has an obligation to take a group's dissent seriously and to give a conscientious reply. (…) Judges and other officials must be willing to address objections. They cannot refuse to listen (…) Moreover, should the judges and other officials listen, the dissenters are not required to accept the answer given to them; they may renew their protest, provided they explain why they are still dissatisfied, and their explanation in turn ought to receive a further and fuller reply. , The Law of Peoples, p. 72, emphasis added]
In short, decent consultation hierarchy is a device that makes political participation 17) possible in a decent non-liberal society. Now, Rawls emphasizes that this doesn't make the decent non-liberal society liberal, which here, he seems to mean democratic. This is because in a decent non-liberal society individuals are not seen as free and equal citizens who deserve equal representation separately according to the maxim; one citizen, one vote. 18) However, this ignores how closely a decent consultation hierarchy resembles the political process in a modern liberal democratic regime.
In most modern liberal democratic societies, it is extremely rare for direct democracy to actually take place. This is not necessarily because direct democracy is undesirable, but rather that direct democracy is unpractical in modern circumstances. So, most liberal democracies take the form of indirect democracy. In an indirect democracy, it is not the 17) Somebody might think whether we should really count participating in a decent consultation hierarchy as a form of political participation. However, it is clear that Rawls thought it should. This is evident when Rawls contrasts between a 'decent hierarchical society' and 'benevolent absolutism'; the only distinguishing feature of the two societies is that the latter lacks a form of political participation. 18) Ibid. p. 71 citizens themselves that devise government policies and enact new laws.
Rather, citizens choose their own representatives, and it is these representatives that actually engage in political matters, not the citizens themselves. This is analogous to the political process of a decent consultation hierarchy. Just as it is the political representatives and not the individual citizens themselves that conduct political policy making in a liberal democratic society, it is the group representatives and not the individual members of the group that do politics in a decent consultation hierarchy.
Just as the political representatives in a liberal democratic society represent the interests of the people that have chosen them, the group representatives in a decent consultation hierarchy represents the interests of the particular group that they are supposed to represent. 
Ⅳ. The Conclusion
So, Rawls claims that we should acknowledge a certain range of nonliberal societies as bona fide members of the international society.
However, in order for a non-liberal society to be regarded as a bona fide member it must meet the following conditions:
(1) The non-liberal society should not have any aggressive aims (2) Human Rights (including a right to private property, a right to various liberties including freedom of thought and religion, a right to life in the form of basic minimum, etc.) should be enshrined in the nonliberal society's system of law (3) The non-liberal society's system of law should impose bona fide moral duties and obligations that follow from a liberal conception of justice (4) The Human Rights enshrined in the non-liberal society's system of law should be sufficiently guaranteed in actual practice (5) Political participation of essentially a deliberative form must be guaranteed (6) And if all things do not turn out as the individual wishes, the individual should be allowed to leave the society with the assistance of the government By meeting all of these conditions, a non-liberal society becomes a decent non-liberal society and earns the right to be respected as an equal member in the Society of Peoples. And a non-liberal society that actually meets all of these criteria really does seem to look decent; by meeting all of these criteria, the non-liberal society in question is clear from any kind of oppressive elements which make it traditionally objectionable; nobody is denied of a right to exit from a group which they do not wish to be identified and nobody is denied of certain fundamental rights and liberties just by being born into a certain social class. So, a decent non-liberal society is quite decent. However, now the question is: how nonliberal is a decent non-liberal society? And the answer is: not very much.
A decent non-liberal society meets virtually every institutional requirements of a well-ordered liberal society; individuals can possess private property, they are guaranteed a basic social minimum, they are free from any form of slavery and forced occupation, they can exercise freedom of thought and religion and nobody is persecuted because their religious or ideological faith, they are able to participate in politics and express political dissent towards virtually any political matter, they are only required to discharge duties and obligations that are deemed bona fide from a liberal standpoint, they even have a right to government assisted emigration if they wish to leave. What more can we ask for?
Empirically, the institutional arrangements of a decent non-liberal society will be practically the same as the institutional arrangements of a well-ordered liberal society. The only difference will be on how the society views its individual members and how the society's conception of justice is justified publicly; whereas the individual members are seen as free and equal citizens in a liberal society, the individual members will be seen as members of a certain group or association in a decent nonliberal society; whereas the conception of justice is justified politically by public reason in a liberal society, the conception of justice will be justified by the particular comprehensive doctrine which the decent nonliberal society affirms. These differences are, of course, important.
However, I am not sure whether these differences are big enough to sufficiently ground the claim that a decent non-liberal society is fundamentally distinct from a well-ordered liberal society.
The problem is analogous to this: suppose that a state's athletic commission announces a controversial announcement that it will officially allow "no-holds-barred" fighting events to be held in public places, provided that the fight event meets certain conditions of decency. So, it is fair to say that Rawls international theory is rather far aloof from the realities of the world structure today. And I believe that it is this practical inapplicability which is the real problem of Rawls' international theory of justice which he presented in the Law of Peoples. 주요어: 롤즈, 만민법, 공정으로서의 정의, 지구촌 정의, 국제정의
